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Anti-American sentiment-a mixture of hatred and fascinationlikely exists in almost all countries. Given public diplomacy's mission to "inform, engage, and inf luence global audiences . . . to reach out beyond foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics and sustained access and inf luence in important sectors of foreign societies," 1 dealing with popular anti-Americanism in target countries is crucial for U.S. public diplomacy. Japan is one of the United States' closest allies, and, the Japanese public's sense of affinity with the United States has remained at a high level compared with other countries. It has been between 70 and 80 percent for almost all the time since the 1980s (even in the worst year, which was 1986, it remained at 67.5 percent), while the sense of affinity to European countries in the 1990s f luctuated between 40 and 60 percent. However, anti-American sentiment in Japan still inf luences its relationship with the United States considerably.
2
A series of economic conf licts, which emerged with Japan's rise as a new economic power after World War II and which escalated since the 1980s as the U.S. trade deficit with Japan increased, have played a large role in raising anti-American sentiment among the Japanese public. Dealing with those economic issues is very important for U.S. national interests. This study will examine the operational strategies and tactics of American public diplomacy officials in doing so.
The U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship and
Anti-Americanism: An Overview
1980s-Early 1990s
Economic relations between the United States and Japan have experienced several major twists in the last few decades. Friction in the bilateral economic relationship became prominent in the 1980s, when the United States experienced sharp increases in its trade deficit to Japan (trade deficit grew more than five times from 10.5 billion dollars in 1980 to 56.9 billion in 1987 at its peak in the 1980s). 3 Throughout the 1980s, Japan's exports and its overall economy boomed while the U.S. economy sagged. This resulted in a gaping bilateral trade difference and a series of testy economic negotiations aimed at narrowing the gap. For example, in 1985 the Reagan administration initiated the Market-Oriented Sector-Selective (MOSS) talks, the first multisector negotiating framework aimed at covering trade negotiations in five sectors simultaneously. The sectors, including telecommunications, medical equipment, and auto parts, were selected because of their potential to facilitate increased U.S. exports to Japan. To increase its exports, the United States required Japan to remove what Washington claimed were "barriers" to the Japanese market. 4 Confrontation over the trade imbalance raised popular U.S. concern over Japanese economic growth and provoked criticism of Japanese economic policies and business practices. Such practices as Keiretsu-a group of enterprises with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings-were seen as unique to Japan and, from the perspective of U.S. exporters and manufacturers, "unfair." This led to an anti-Japanese attitude-described as "Japan bashing"-among the American public. The notion that Japan was outperforming the United States dominated the policy debate and was the topic of many books and journals.
5 Accordingly, the American public became increasingly hostile and cautious toward Japan. This, in turn, caused resentment among many in the Japanese public, and it therefore became a public diplomacy problem for the United States.
A 1990 U.S. opinion poll conducted by NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation) and ABC shows this trend explicitly. In response to the question "Which do you think is the greater threat to the security of the United States, the military force of the Soviet Union or the economic power of Japan?" 57 percent of respondents chose Japan while 38 percent chose the Soviet Union. 6 Concern over
